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DEFUSING EPISTEMIC RELATIVISM 
 
 
DUNCAN PRITCHARD 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
ABSTRACT. This paper explores the question of whether there is an interesting form of 
specifically epistemic relativism available, a position which can lend support to claims of a 
broadly relativistic nature but which is not committed to relativism about truth. It is argued 
that the most plausible rendering of such a view turns out not to be the radical thesis that it is 
often represented as being.  
 
 
0. One of the key motivations for relativism is the idea that two parties to a dispute could 
each be equally in the right. So, for example, you claimon the basis of your religious 
worldview and the framework of beliefs that this involvesthat it is a historical fact that 
Moses parted the Red Sea, while I claimon the basis of my secular worldview and the 
framework of beliefs that this involvesthat no such thing ever happened and yet, the 
relativistic thought goes, both of us could be right. Opting for truth relativism is one way of 
accommodating this faultless disagreement motivation for relativism, such that what each 
party to the dispute says could be true. That is, relative to your religious framework, what you 
claim about Moses could be true while, relative to my secular framework, what I (counter-) 
claim could also be (simultaneously) true.  
 One problem with truth relativism, aside from the fact that the view seems to be 
committed to an independently implausible account of truth, is that it offends against our 
intuition that there is genuine conflict in the cases in question. That is, if we opt for truth 
relativism, then rather than getting an explanation of why this is a genuine disagreement 
between two parties who are, nevertheless, both right, we instead get the result that the 
disagreement in question wasn’t genuine after all. That is, when you say that Moses parted 
the Red Sea you take yourself to be speaking the truth simpliciter (i.e., not the truth relative 
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to your framework), and accordingly you take anyone who contradicts you to be speaking a 
falsehood (i.e., and not the truth relative to their framework). The same goes, mutatis 
mutandis, for my counterclaim.  This fact alone should make us wonder whether there is not 
a way of accommodating the key motivation for relativismthe idea of faultless 
disagreementwithout buying into relativism about truth. The obvious way to go in this 
respect would be to explore the possibility of a specifically epistemic relativismi.e., a 
relativism about epistemic standing which is not also committed to relativism about truth and 
so which could, in principle, accommodate our intuition that there is genuine conflict in the 
cases under consideration. Such a view would also have the added advantage of avoiding the 
more general problems that afflict truth relativism.1 
 
 
1. So an epistemic relativism would hold that two parties to a dispute could be genuinely 
disagreeing over some facte.g., whether Moses parted the Red Seabut that the 
disagreement is nevertheless faultless, where the faultlessness is to be construed in a 
specifically epistemic fashion. Continuing the idea of framework-relative truth, the thought 
would be that relative to one epistemic frameworksuch as your religious frameworkyour 
claim has a certain epistemic standing, while relative to another epistemic frameworksuch 
as my secular frameworkmy counterclaim would have an epistemic standing of identical 
strength. While only one of us is in fact right, the point remains that any epistemic criticism I 
make of your claim will only have force relative to my framework and not relative to yours.  
 Perhaps the best way of understanding this talk of epistemic frameworks here is in 
terms of clusters of epistemic principles which determine the epistemic standing of beliefs. A 
religious epistemic framework, for example, would accord a central role to the testimony of 
scripture since, as the word of God, this would be treated as a reliable source of true beliefs 
on relevant subjects (e.g., on the historical episode in which Moses led the Israelites out of 
Egypt). Given this epistemic framework, agents would thus be at least prima facie justified in 
forming their beliefs on the basis of scripture. In contrast, a secular epistemic framework 
would not include a principle of this sort, since it would not be part of such a framework to 
regard the Bible as generally reliable in this way (though it might be thought reliable, qua 
historical text, on a restricted range of propositions).  
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 Simply granting that there are different epistemic frameworks in this sense will not 
suffice to generate epistemic relativism, however, since what is in addition required is a 
further thesis to the effect that no epistemic framework is superior to any other epistemic 
framework. Only once this claim is in play do we get the conception of faultless 
disagreement that is required, for it now follows that whatever epistemic censure one applies 
to the other party can be legitimately ignored by that other party (and the same goes for any 
epistemic censure that they level against you). Once one starts to think of one’s epistemic 
standing as being dependent upon one’s epistemic framework, then a motivation for this key 
relativist claim starts to become apparent. After all, if all epistemic standing is framework-
relative, then it follows that there can be no framework-independent way of conducting an 
epistemic assessment of an opponent’s framework. Moreover, it also follows that one cannot 
offer any framework-independent support for one’s epistemic framework. Hence, it follows 
that all epistemic frameworks are on an epistemic par.  
 Michael Williams (2007) gives a neat expression to this line of argumentwhich he 
calls the “fundamental argument for epistemic relativism”in the following passage:2 
 
In determining whether a beliefany beliefis justified, we always rely, implicitly or 
explicitly, on an epistemic framework: some standards or procedures that separate justified 
from unjustified convictions. But what about the claims embodied in the framework itself: are 
they justified? In answering this question, we inevitably apply our own epistemic framework. 
So, assuming that our framework is coherent and does not undermine itself, the best we can 
hope for is a justification that is epistemically circular, employing our epistemic framework in 
support of itself. Since this procedure can be followed by anyone, whatever his epistemic 
framework, all such frameworks, provided they are coherent, are equally defensible (or 
indefensible). (M. Williams 2007, 3-4) 
 
As Williams makes clear in this passage, the very idea that all epistemic standing is 
framework-relative entails that one is unable to offer a framework-independent validation of 
one’s own epistemic framework. By the same token, it also entails that one is unable to offer 
a framework-independent epistemic assessment of an opposing epistemic framework, a 
framework which will also lack a framework-independent validation. The conclusion is 
irresistible: all epistemic frameworks are as good (or, if you prefer, as bad) as each other.  
 Given this argument, it is obviously important to be able to offer some account of 
how one goes about individuating epistemic frameworks. If one simply identifies an 
epistemic framework with a set of epistemic principles, then this would almost certainly 
generate the unfortunate result that no two people share an epistemic framework, since it is 
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likely that there would be some divergence in the epistemic principles that they endorse. The 
kind of epistemic relativism that would result would be extremely radical. Intuitively, though, 
epistemic relativism ought not to be committed to a radical thesis of this sort. That is, it is 
surely not agreement on all the relevant epistemic principles that determines one’s acceptance 
of an epistemic framework, but rather one’s agreement on a fundamental sub-set of those 
principles. I’m unable to offer any compelling basis on which to make this fundamental/non-
fundamental distinction, but we can side-step this issue to a certain extent by focussing on 
disputes where the two participants intuitively do disagree on the fundamental epistemic 
principles, such as the ‘did Moses part the Red Sea’ debate between the believer and the non-
believer described above. Given that a fudge of this sort makes the epistemic relativist 
position more palatable, this ought to be an unproblematic move to make.  
 A second issue that I want to side-step in order to give the epistemic relativist’s 
position the best run for its money is whether one could coherently endorse one’s epistemic 
framework while simultaneously regarding it as no better, epistemically, than any other 
epistemic framework. As many have noted, epistemic relativism seems to inexorably lead to 
scepticism, and here is one reason why: if one regards one’s epistemic framework as on an 
epistemic par with any other epistemic framework (including, crucially, frameworks that are 
fundamentally opposed to one’s own), then it is hard to see how that is compatible with the 
idea that one’s beliefs enjoy any positive epistemic status at all. I take it, however, that the 
interest in epistemic relativism would be severely undermined if it just turned out to be a 
form of scepticism in disguise. What we are interested in is the possibility of there being 
genuine positive epistemic status for our beliefs cast along epistemic relativist lines, and 
scepticism is clearly incompatible with positive epistemic status.3  
 For the sake of argument, however, let us simply grant that it is plausible to suppose 
that one could endorse the epistemic relativist claim about all epistemic standing being 
framework-relative without it having this sceptical consequence. As we will see, there are 
problems enough on the horizon for the epistemic relativist, so we can comfortably set this 
difficulty to one side.    
 With these points in mind, let us examine the epistemic relativist thesis further. 
 
 
2. The first thing to notice is that given that epistemic relativism is here being construed in 
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such a way that it is not allied with truth relativism, it trivially follows that there is a sense in 
which two opponents to a dispute, each employing a different epistemic framework, are not 
on an epistemic parafter all, only one of the parties can be right. Relatedly, it ought to be 
consistent with epistemic relativism as we have understood it here that one party to a dispute 
might know what she believes whereas the other party does not (i.e., the one party to the 
dispute has a sufficiently strong framework-dependent epistemic standing in favour of her 
belief and in addition has a true belief, and so knows, whereas the other party merely has a 
strong framework-dependent epistemic standing in favour of her false belief). When we say 
that the two parties to the dispute have an equal positive epistemic standing for their 
respective beliefs, however, we are clearly not to be read as excluding this particular sort of 
epistemic disanalogy.  
 On the face of it, this point might seem harmless, since it appears that the key 
epistemic relativist thesis remains untouchedi.e., the thesis that, the truth or falsity of the 
target beliefs aside, all epistemic standing is framework-relative. As we will now see, 
however, this point does seem to have some interesting consequences, consequences which 
are unlikely to be welcomed by the epistemic relativist.  
 Suppose, for the sake of argument, that appeal to scripture is indeed a reliable way of 
forming one’s beliefs about relevant subject matters, such as whether Moses parted the Red 
Sea. One does not need to be an epistemic internalist to hold that such a fact about the 
reliability of the belief-forming process that one employs could have ramifications for the 
overall epistemic standing of one’s belief, in the sense that one’s belief enjoys a greater 
degree of overall epistemic support if it is reliably formed than if, ceteris paribus, it isn’t 
reliably formed. The problem with allowing reliabilityor, indeed, any externalist factor of 
this general sort, such as an indefeasibility conditionto be relevant to the overall epistemic 
standing of an agent’s belief is thatgiven the denial of truth relativism at any ratewhether 
or not one’s belief is in fact reliably formed is not determined by one’s epistemic framework 
but simply by the relevant facts that obtain. It seems, then, that if one does not ally epistemic 
relativism to truth relativism, then there is a substantive sense in which the epistemic standing 
of an agent’s belief is not a purely framework-relative matter after all.  
 Now, of course, it need not follow from the fact that the one party to this dispute is 
forming her belief in a reliable fashion that the other party is forming her belief in an 
unreliable fashion. Since a belief-forming process could be both reliable and also at the same 
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time falliblein that it produces a false belief on this occasionthere is no contradiction in 
supposing that both belief-forming processes are equally reliable. It thus does not follow 
from the claim that the reliability of the relevant belief-forming process has implications for 
the epistemic standing of one’s belief that the parties to this debate must have beliefs with 
different overall epistemic standings (even though this does follow from the fact that only 
one of the beliefs can be true).  
 Nevertheless, that externaland therefore, it seems, framework-independentfactors 
can, intuitively, have a bearing on the overall epistemic standing of an agent’s belief is still 
significant for our discussion. After all, we can imagine a situation in which the one party to 
the debate is forming her belief in a reliable fashion and the other isn’t, even though both 
parties are forming their beliefs entirely in keeping with the strictures laid down by their 
respective epistemic frameworks, and so enjoy the same degree of framework-relative 
epistemic support for their respective beliefs. In such a case, the one agent would enjoy 
additional epistemic support for her belief relative to the other agent, even though the 
framework-dependent epistemic support is, putatively, the same. If this is right, then there is 
a clear sense in which although each party to the dispute may enjoy an equal degree of 
framework-relative epistemic support for their belief, nevertheless, their beliefs are not on an 
epistemic par.  
 As we saw above, a core part of the motivation for epistemic relativism is to capture 
an entirely epistemic conception of faultless disagreement which does not presuppose truth 
relativism, and we noted that key to such a conception is the thesis that the two parties to the 
dispute have beliefs that are on an epistemic par. Allowing that the overall epistemic standing 
of one’s beliefs can be influenced by factors outwith one’s epistemic framework appears to 
fatally undermine this thesis.  
  
 
3. There are a couple of moves that the epistemic relativist might make in response to this 
problem. One possibility might be to maintain that such ‘external’ factors can be incorporated 
into the framework such that they are not framework-independent factors after all. This move 
might sound entirely reasonable at first pass, but it does not stand up to scrutiny. The reason 
for this is subtle.  
 To begin with notice that there is a sense in which external factors of this sort are part 
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of every epistemic framework. If an epistemic framework did not think that, say, the 
reliability of belief-forming process was relevant to the overall epistemic standing of a belief, 
then it is hard to see why we would regard it as an epistemic framework in the first place. It is 
for this reason that it sounds initially quite straightforward to subsume the external factors 
into the framework itself.  
 The trouble is, however, that to say that a consideration like reliability is part of any 
epistemic framework is thereby to say that it is not a feature specific to any particular 
framework and therefore, in the relevant sense, not part of the framework at all. Recall that 
we described an epistemic framework as being a system of epistemic principles. It is an open 
question how we are to understand the notion of an epistemic principle, but it ought to be 
clear that, for example, ‘form one’s belief in a reliable (i.e., truth-conducive) manner’ is not 
an epistemic principle. The point of epistemic principles, after all, is to guide us, and yet a 
principle as general as this is of little use in this regard. Instead, what we seek from an 
epistemic principle is something much more specific, such as ‘if the religious leader tells you 
that p, then believe p’. Of course, what would make this principle an epistemic principle is 
the fact that it is at least meant to be truth-conducive, but that is not to say that there is a 
meta-principle in play here of the more general form but only to identify what all epistemic 
principles have in common.  
 We can further emphasise this point by considering what would happen if we 
regarded the truth conditionan external condition par excellenceto be part of the 
epistemic framework, and thus treated the principle ‘if p is false, then don’t believe p’ (or 
something in that general ballpark) as part of the epistemic principles that make up that 
framework. We noted above that the truth of an agent’s belief has a bearing on the overall 
epistemic standing of that beliefat least in the minimal sense that one can only know what 
one believes when what one believes is truebut that whether or not a belief is true is a 
framework-independent matter. We can now get a clearer grip on why this must be so by 
considering how any principle which formulated this demand for truthsuch as the principle 
just formulated, ‘if p is false, then don’t believe p’would clearly be redundant. Indeed, like 
the ‘reliability’ principle just described, if a principle like this tells us anything it tells us 
something about the nature of epistemic principles more generallyi.e., that they are meant 
to be guides to enable us to form true beliefs.4 
 8 
 The upshot of all this is that however we are to think of epistemic frameworks, and 
the epistemic principles that make up those frameworks, we are not to think of external 
conditions like the reliability condition, much less the truth condition, as being part of the 
framework, but rather as inevitable constraints on what counts as an epistemic framework. 
There is thus no scope to respond to the problem we have noted for epistemic relativism by 
simply incorporating the relevant external conditions into the epistemic principles that make 
up the framework. 
 
  
4. A second way of dealing with this problem could be to deny that external factors like 
reliability have any bearing on the overall epistemic standing of an agent’s belief. The 
epistemic relativist might hold, for example, that it is only belief-forming processes that are 
held by the relevant framework to be reliable that can raise the epistemic standing of the 
target belief, and that whether or not the belief-forming processes are in fact reliable has no 
additional bearing on the overall epistemic standing of the belief.  
 Presumably, however, the epistemic relativist would not wish to extend this line of 
reasoning to the truth condition. For example, they surely would not wish to hold that 
whether or not a belief counted as an instance of knowledge was dependent solely on the 
epistemic framework and not, in part, on whether the belief in question is true. Remember 
that we are interested here in a specifically epistemic relativism which is not allied to 
relativism about truth. Moreover, if the epistemic relativist is not concerned with truth, then it 
is hard to see why we should regard the epistemic frameworks in question as genuinely 
epistemic in the first place. The trouble is, of course, that once one allows the meeting of the 
truth condition to be a framework-independent matter then it is hard to see on what principled 
basis she can object to allowing other relevant factual matterssuch as whether or not an 
agent’s belief is indeed reliably formedas counting as both framework-independent and 
epistemically relevant too. 
 Even once we make an exception for the truth conditionan exception which seems 
entirely ad hocsuch that only this condition is framework-independent, it remains that 
epistemic relativism on this picture would be committed to a rather austere form of epistemic 
internalism. It would hold there was nothing more to knowledge than the conjunction of a 
belief which is both true and sufficiently epistemically supported by the lights of the relevant 
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epistemic framework, regardless of whether the belief so formed is indeed reliably formed. 
Such an extreme form of epistemic internalism is, however, incoherent.  
 We can illustrate this point in a rather straightforward way by noting that such a view 
would be subject to Gettier-style cases. Given that the truth of the relevant belief is a 
framework-independent matterand thus that whether or not an agent knows is a 
framework-independent matterit follows that a view of this sort will inevitably be 
susceptible to such cases. In particular, an agent might have excellent framework-dependent 
grounds in support of her belief, and that belief might be true, and yet the belief has been 
‘gettiered’ and so does not count as knowledge. The problem for the view, however, is to 
explain what such a lack of knowledge would consist in, given that there is meant to be 
nothing more to the epistemic standing of the target belief than the framework-relative 
epistemic standing plus the obtaining of the truth condition. 
 In order to bring this point into sharp relief, consider the following example. Suppose 
that an agent forms her belief that Moses parted the Red Sea on the basis of the testimony of 
a religious leader, a belief-forming process which is held to supply robust epistemic support 
from the perspective of the relevant epistemic framework. Suppose further that Moses did 
indeed part the Red Sea as our agent believes. The twist in the story, however, is that our 
agent misheard what the religious leader said, who was actually relating an entirely different 
historical event. Still, the agent has strong framework-relative epistemic support for her belief 
and, in addition, her belief is true, and yet we clearly do not want to treat such a belief as a 
case of knowledge because it is just a matter of luck that her belief is true. 
 There are various options available to the epistemic relativist at this point. The first is 
to bite the bullet and argue that the agent in this case does indeed have knowledge. I take it 
that this kind of response is unsustainable. If epistemic relativism is committed to a theory of 
knowledge on which lucky true belief of this sort can count as knowledge, then that is, I 
suggest, a pretty decisive strike against it. Two further options are, however, worthy of a 
more thorough investigation. The first is to claim that reflection on the nature of the case 
illustrates that the agent’s belief does not enjoy an appropriately robust framework-relative 
epistemic support after all. The second, which marks a radical, though perhaps not 
unprincipled, departure from the epistemic relativist view set out above, simply concedes that 
there is a type of epistemic standing that is framework-independent, but nevertheless 
maintains that a legitimate and substantive form of epistemic relativism remains even once 
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we make this concession. We will take these two proposals in turn.  
 
 
5. The first proposal might not seem too problematic at first pass. After all, one could 
reasonably argue that in this particular case the principle in play is not to merely follow what 
one believes are the words of the religious leader, but to follow what in fact are the words of 
the religious leader. With this constraint in play, then it is no longer the case that the agent in 
the Gettier-style example above does enjoy a robust (i.e., knowledge-supporting) epistemic 
standing for her belief (though she may enjoy some degree of positive epistemic standing that 
falls short of a knowledge-supporting epistemic standing). This would ensure that the Gettier-
style case would not get the grip that it is meant to, in that there would be an explanation, in 
terms of the framework-relative epistemic standing of the agent, of why she lacks knowledge.  
 Such a response may be plausible in this particular case, but the problem with the 
strategy is that it will not appropriately generalise. We can express this problem in terms of a 
dilemma. The one horn of the dilemma is the option of allowing that the belief-forming 
processes in question are fallible in near-by worldsi.e., can sometimes, in near-by worlds at 
least, produce false beliefs. Insofar as the relevant belief-forming process is fallible in this 
sense, however, then we should be able to produce a Gettier-style example. For instance, so 
long as the belief-forming method of forming one’s beliefs in line with what the religious 
leader in fact states is fallible in near-by worlds, then there will, by definition, be a near-by 
possible world in which the agent’s belief is false and yet properly formed by the lights of 
that epistemic framework. All we need now suppose, however, is that the proposition in 
question is true nonetheless, albeit in a way that is unrelated to the manner in which the belief 
was actually formed, and we have our Gettier-style example. The problem of accounting for 
why agents in such cases lack knowledge on the epistemic relativist view thus re-emerges.  
 Consider, for example, the following case. Suppose that forming one’s beliefs on the 
basis of the religious leader’s testimony is a reliable belief-forming process, but also a near-
by worlds fallible process. Perhaps, for example, the religious leader sometimes, albeit rarely, 
gets it wrong and so testifies to a falsehood. All we now need to do is imagine a case in 
which the religious leader gets it wrong, but adapt the case to ensure that her testimony is true 
after all. Perhaps she inadvertently asserts not-p rather than p as she intended, and so ends up 
asserting a truth by mistake. Clearly, however, anyone who formed their belief in p on the 
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basis of this testimony would not thereby gain knowledge because of the epistemic luck 
involved. 
 Alternativelyand this is the other horn of dilemmathe claim might be that the 
relevant belief-forming processes are all near-by worlds infallible, in the sense that there is 
no near-by possible world in which the belief-forming process results in a false belief.5 If that 
were true, then one wouldn’t be able to formulate a Gettier-style counterexample to the view, 
since such counterexamples, as we have just noted, essentially depend upon the possibility 
that there is a near-by possible world in which the reliable process results in a false belief. It 
is only if such a possibility is allowed that one could then adapt the case to construct a 
Gettier-style case.  
 The problem, however, is that it is hard to see what would entitle one to regard all of 
one’s belief-forming processes as near-by worlds infallible. For sure, one might reasonably 
claim that some of one’s belief-forming processes are near-by worlds infallible. Perhaps, for 
example, one might argue that there could be no near-by possible worlds in which one’s 
religious leader would assert a falsehood. But could one seriously contend that all of one’s 
belief-forming processes are near-by worlds infallible? The worry is that it seems that in 
order for the epistemic relativist to avoid this problem they are committed to making 
implausible demands on epistemic frameworks.  
 Moreover, even if we can imagine an epistemic framework in which all the belief-
forming processes at issue are near-by worlds infallibleand supposing that we set aside 
what doubts we might have about the plausibility of such a frameworkit still remains that it 
ought not to be a pre-condition on an epistemic framework that it treats all belief-forming 
processes in this way. But if epistemic frameworks are unable to accommodate external 
conditions on knowledge then it seems that the problem that we have just canvassed will 
resurface. At the very least, those frameworks which sanction belief-forming processes that 
are near-by worlds fallible will be susceptible to Gettier-style cases and, as a consequence, 
untenable.  
 
 
6. This leaves us with our second option, which is to maintain that although the overall 
epistemic standing of an agent’s belief could be dependent on framework-independent factors 
like reliability, nevertheless there is an important sense in which the epistemic standing of an 
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agent’s belief is framework-dependent in such a way as to capture the core motivations 
behind epistemic relativism. The view has a certain prima facie plausibility. Suppose that we 
have a dispute in which both parties to the dispute enjoy, relative to their different epistemic 
frameworks, equal degrees of epistemic support for their opposing beliefs. On the conception 
of epistemic relativism under consideration it might nevertheless be the case that one party to 
the dispute has a belief which enjoys a greater degree of overall epistemic support once 
framework-independent factors like the reliability of the relevant belief-forming processes 
are taken into account. Nevertheless, the claim would be that there is still a substantive sense 
in which both beliefs are on an epistemic par and thus in which the disagreement is in the 
relevant sense epistemically faultless. 
 One can bring this point out by imagining our two agents locked in debate. Suppose 
they are debating whether Moses parted the Red Sea, with one disputant maintaining, on 
religious grounds, that this event took place, and the other disputant maintaining, on broadly 
secular grounds, that it didn’t. The thought would be that while the reliability of the belief-
forming processes in questione.g., forming one’s belief in the light of scripturewill have 
ramifications for the overall epistemic standing of these beliefs, it is precisely because of the 
‘external’ nature of this factor that it is not the sort of consideration that either party could 
legitimately raise in that dialectical context.  
 For example, one could imagine the one party insisting that forming one’s beliefs 
about historical events via the evidence of scripture is a reliable method of belief-formation. 
Clearly, though, the other party to this dispute will simply reject this consideration since she 
will claim, in line with her epistemic framework, that such a method of belief-formation is 
unreliable. The crux of the matter is that in proposing one’s method of belief-formation as an 
epistemically legitimate method is thereby to say that by one’s lights it is a reliable belief-
forming method. If one didn’t regard one’s belief-forming method in this way, then it is hard 
to see why one would regard the fact that one has formed one’s beliefs in this way as being 
specifically epistemically relevant to the standing of the belief, rather than being relevant in 
some other way (such as aesthetically relevant). But if that is right then simply to maintain, in 
addition to offering one’s grounds in favour of the target belief, that one has formed one’s 
belief in a reliable fashion is to add very little to the debate since it ought to be taken as given 
that one so regards one’s method of belief-formation. Moreover, since we have a clash of 
epistemic frameworks here, then it is also inevitably going to be the case that one’s opponent 
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will not accept this reliability claim. Thus, the debate is not advanced one jot by adverting to 
the fact that one regards one’s belief-forming process as reliable. Of course, if one’s belief-
forming process is indeed reliable, then that will have a bearing on the overall epistemic 
standing of the belief on this view, but the claim is that it does not have a bearing in the 
specifically dialectical sense that we are primarily interested in. 
 I think that the epistemic relativist may be on to something here, but that the form of 
relativism in playwhat we might term a dialectical epistemic relativismis not nearly as 
radical as it might at first appear.  
 Before we can properly address this issue, a few remarks are in order regarding the 
epistemic significance of disagreement. After all, one might hold that the mere fact that 
someone disagrees with you could have ramifications for the epistemic standing of your 
belief. For example, one might hold that this constitutes a standing defeater as regards the 
epistemic standing of your belief in the target proposition. If this is right, then even a 
dialectical epistemic relativism would have a problem maintaining that the two opposing 
beliefs in question are on an epistemic par since, if anything, the presence of such 
disagreement would have the effect of undermining the positive framework-relative 
epistemic standing of both beliefs. Dialectical epistemic relativism would then provide 
support for a limited form of scepticism, thereby depriving the view of much of its interest.6 
 That said, I think we can safely ignore this issue, since even those who think that 
disagreement is epistemically significant in something like this fashionsuch as Richard 
Feldman (2006)put some relevant constraints on the type of disagreement which is 
significant (such as that the other disputant must be an ‘epistemic peer’). With these 
constraints in play, the dialectical epistemic relativist would almost certainly be in a position 
to maintain her thesis that the two opposing beliefs in question are on an epistemic par on 
account of how the disagreement in question fails to meet the relevant conditions (e.g., one 
has good framework-dependent grounds for regarding the other disputant as not being an 
epistemic peer). With this caveat in mind, let us now consider just how radical dialectical 
epistemic relativism is.7 
 
 
7. One reason why one might regard dialectical epistemic relativism as a radical proposal is 
that it might be thought to offer a mandate for dogmatism, in the sense that one’s epistemic 
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framework could be entirelyand, crucially, legitimately‘closed’ such that it will allow 
one to discount all counter-arguments and counterevidence that those from different 
epistemic frameworks might offer. For instance, one might conceive of a religious framework 
in which any counterevidence is treated as inherently dubious. So, for example, if someone 
were to produce archaeological evidence which appears to suggest that the Red Sea could not 
have been parted at the historical juncture in question, then an epistemic principle within the 
epistemic framework would kick-in to suggest that such counterevidence should be regarded 
as simply a test of faith.  
 Now I don’t doubt that a principle of this sort may in fact be part of a particular 
worldview, but notice that on at least one way of reading this principle it isn’t obviously an 
epistemic principle at all, by anyone lights. That is, if the point of the principle is explicitly to 
evade the truth, then it clearly isn’t an epistemic principle since a minimal requirement of an 
epistemic principle is surely that it purports to assist one in achieving one’s epistemic goals, 
like gaining true beliefs. So understood, however, this principle is explicitly designed to 
frustrate one’s epistemic goals.8  
 That said, it may seem as if there are epistemic principles available that would licence 
such apparent dogmatism. After all, one might, say, regard scripture as a highly reliable 
source of truths about certain subject matters and, if one did so regard scripture, it would 
seem to be a natural consequence that one should thereby regard any evidence which seemed 
to conflict with scripturesuch as that the Red Sea was not partedas being inherently 
suspect. (Indeed, scripture might even explicitly dictate that one should be suspicious of any 
evidence that contradicted the testimony of scripture). There is no obvious reason why we 
should regard the agent in this case as being unconcerned with the truth, and thus one cannot 
evade the charge of dogmatism here simply by noting that some apparent epistemic principles 
are not really epistemic principles at all. 
 I take it that what the defender of such a view has in mind is something like the 
following argument: 
 
P1  S has excellent framework-relative grounds for believing p. 
P2  S competently deduces from p that any putative evidence against p is misleading, thereby 
coming to believe that any putative evidence against p is misleading while retaining her belief 
in p.9 
C1 S has excellent framework-relative grounds for believing that any putative evidence against p 
is misleading. 
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This seems like a perfectly good form of reasoning, but if it is then it appears that 
dogmaticism is perfectly epistemically respectableindeed, it seems to be positively licensed 
in certain cases.  
 There are a few things that we need to note about this argument. The first is that if it 
does license dogmatism, then it does so regardless of whether epistemic relativism is true. 
That is, one could drop the reference to the grounds in question here being framework-
relative in P1 and C1 without this in any way undermining the argumentit would still be 
the case that the argument would support the conclusion that one has excellent grounds to 
regard any evidence against one’s target belief as misleading.  
 Relatedly, if this argument holds then it can be made use of by any epistemic 
frameworkinsofar as that framework supplies strong grounds for believing a proposition 
then it is thereby in a position to supply strong grounds for believing that any putative 
evidence against that proposition is misleading. So if this form of reasoning is deemed 
acceptable, then the problem it poses is entirely general, and not specific to epistemic 
frameworks that might antecedently be regarded as ‘dogmatic’. 
 More importantly for our purposes, the third thing to note about this argument is that 
it doesn’t yet entail dogmatism, but merely implies it. That is, strictly speaking, there is a 
further inferential step in play here, in the ballpark of C2: 
 
C2 S is entitled to disregard any putative evidence against p. 
 
Even if one accepts the reasoning up to C1and I think there is good independent reason to 
be sceptical in this regardone might still resist this motivation for dogmatism if one could 
block the inferential move from C1 to C2.10 Can such a move be blocked? 
 I think so. In order to see this, one only needs to note that all C1 motivates is in fact 
the weaker C2*: 
 
C2* S is entitled to be suspicious of any putative evidence against p. 
 
That is, C1 simply captures the idea that if you do indeed have good reason for believing a 
proposition, then you thereby have good reason for thinking that any putative 
counterevidence should be treated with caution. There is a big difference, however, between 
treating putative counterevidence with caution and disregarding it out-of-hand in advance, as 
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C2 demands. Indeed, treating putative counterevidence with caution is entirely compatible 
with coming to see that such counterevidence is bona fide, and so counts against the target 
belief. C2* thus does not license dogmatism, unlike C2.   
 So even if the reasoning from P1-C1 is allowed to stand, it still does not follow that 
dogmatism is thereby validated, since the crucial further inferential step to C2 can be 
blocked.  
 
 
8. It is thus far from clear that dialectical epistemic relativism does lead to dogmatism. On the 
one hand, we have seen that there is no reason for thinking that any principle which explicitly 
licensed dogmatism would count as an epistemic principle in the first place. On the other 
hand, what general arguments there are for dogmatism are not specific to epistemic relativism 
and do not, in any case, have any force on closer inspection.   
 In one sense, this is good news for the dialectical epistemic relativist, since it means 
that the view does not have one unpleasant consequence that it is often held to have. On the 
other hand, however, this could also be regarded as bad news, in the sense that it suggests 
that dialectical epistemic relativism is not nearly as radical a position as it might at first have 
appeared. For without the dogmatism there is now nothing to ‘insulate’ epistemic frameworks 
from the influence of judgements made by other epistemic frameworks. This point is 
especially pertinent given that we remind ourselves that the dialectical version of epistemic 
relativism presently under consideration is merely an epistemic relativism about an aspect of 
an agent’s overall epistemic standing, and is not a view about epistemic standing simpliciter. 
So while dialectical epistemic relativism allows that there is a limited sense in which the 
epistemic standing of two opposing beliefs could be on a par, this thesis is compatible both 
with the thesis that the overall epistemic standing of the two beliefs could be different and 
with the thesis that there is no party to this dispute who has a standing epistemic entitlement 
to completely disregard the views of the other (and so it is also compatible with the rejection 
of the claim that all epistemic frameworks are as good as each other). But if that is right, then 
much of what was thought to be troubling about epistemic relativism starts to disappear. 
Indeed, the view that emerges seems entirely palatable.  
 Consider again the debate between the religious believer and the secular believer 
regarding the proposition that Moses parted the Red Sea that we looked at earlier. What we 
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were looking for was a conception of epistemic relativism which could capture the idea of 
faultless disagreement in this regard but which was not committed to a form of relativism 
about truth (such that there was a fact of the matter at issue in the debate). In a minimal sense, 
dialectical epistemic relativism does indeed capture the faultless disagreement motivation for 
relativism, since it is entirely possible that each of the opposing beliefs could enjoy the same 
degree of framework-relative epistemic support. Nevertheless, we saw that in order to make 
the view plausible it was essential to distinguish between a belief’s overall epistemic support 
and its framework-relative epistemic support. With this distinction in mind, it does not follow 
from the fact that these two opposing beliefs have an equal degree of framework-relative 
epistemic support that they enjoy an equal degree of epistemic support simpliciter. It could 
be, for example, that only the religious believer is forming her belief in a reliable fashion. In 
this sense, then, we don’t ensure the more robust conception of faultless disagreement. 
 Equally, we also saw that a dialectical epistemic relativism does not lend support to 
what we might regard as a natural consequence of a genuine form of relativism, in that it does 
not sanction dogmatism, at least not in any robust form. The religious believer who enjoys 
excellent framework-relative grounds for her belief that Moses parted the Red Sea is entitled 
to be suspicious of any counterevidence offered by the proponent of the opposing belief (who 
operates within a different epistemic framework), but she is not entitled to dismiss such 
counterevidence out-of-hand. At most, she is entitled to be suspicious of such 
counterevidence (though I think even this claim will require qualification in certain ways), 
but we can surely abide a modest dogmatism of this sort. Indeed, as we have seen, even a 
non-relativist account of epistemic standing will license dogmatism of this sort, so it can 
hardly be thought to be a peculiarity of the epistemic relativist position that it generates this 
result.  
 Indeed, once we recognise that even the holders of well-grounded beliefs by epistemic 
relativist lights need to be open to counterevidence, including counterevidence offered by 
those who inhabit different epistemic frameworks, then it becomes clear even the epistemic 
relativist must allow that there is no epistemic justification for a ‘closed’ epistemic 
framework, one that will not countenance engagement with other epistemic frameworks. I 
don’t doubt that it is a simple sociological truth that our religious believer and non-believer 
may give up on a genuine epistemic engagement fairly quickly, either by ignoring the other 
person’s viewpoint or by resorting to engagement of a different sort (e.g., name calling). 
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Moreover, there are practical reasons why an epistemic engagement with epistemic 
frameworks which have very different grounding epistemic principles may be 
counterproductive. But the crucial point is that by the lights of a dialectical epistemic 
relativism there is no epistemological basis for ignoring the opposing claims made by 
proponents of different epistemic frameworks.   
 
 
9. So once one disentangles epistemic relativism from truth relativism, then the only plausible 
rendering of the view available is a dialectical epistemic relativism of the form just described. 
But a position of this sort, while capturing the key motivation for relativismat last in a 
rather minimal fashiondoes so in such a way that the resulting view seems unremarkable, 
even harmless (which is not of course to say that the view is correct). Thus, a specifically 
epistemic relativism, once brought forth for closer scrutiny and suitably refined so as to make 
it coherent, is not the philosophical bogey-man that it may first appear.11,12 
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NOTES 
 
1  There has been quite a lot of discussion of relativism about truth in the recent literature. For some of the more 
prominent discussions, see Lynch (2004), B. Williams (2004), Blackburn (2005), and Boghossian (2006). (See 
also the recent discussions of the ‘new’ truth relativisma much more modest thesis than standard forms of 
truth relativism, though a relativist view nonethelesssuch as Kölbel (2002; 2003), MacFarlane (2003; 2005a; 
2005b), Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2004), Richard (2004), and Brogaard (forthcoming)). There has been 
much less discussion of a specifically epistemic relativism. For two key exceptions in this regard, see 
Boghossian (2006) and M. Williams (2007). For a response to Boghossian’s treatment of epistemic relativism, 
see Kalderon (2006). 
2  Note that Williams discusses “epistemic systems” rather than epistemic frameworks. Since there is no 
difference in what these phrases mean for our purposes here, I have substituted my terminology for his. 
3  Interestingly, there is a way of reading Pyrrhonian scepticism along epistemic relativist lines. For more 
discussion of this interpretation, see Gaukroger (1995).  
4  Note that I am not assuming epistemic value monism herei.e., the thesis that there is only one ultimate 
epistemic value, in this case truth (or true belief). The point is only that the goal of truth is essential to any 
properly epistemic framework, not that this is the only epistemic goal. For more on the debate between 
epistemic value monists and pluralists, see David (2005) and Kvanvig (2005).  
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5  It should be clear, I hope, that a process which is near-by worlds infallible is not infallible simpliciter (i.e., 
infallible across all worlds).  
6  See Kelly (2005, §1) for a good description of how treating all disagreement as epistemically significant in 
this way can licence a kind of scepticism (a scepticism which, interestingly, parallels a key Pyrrhonian argument 
for scepticism). For an endorsement of the idea that reflection on the epistemology of disagreement can license a 
kind of scepticism, see Frances (2005) and Feldman (2006).  
7  There is a growing debate on the epistemology of disagreement. See especially, Frances (2005), Kelly (2005), 
Feldman (2006), Christiansen (forthcoming) and Elga (forthcoming). 
8  I think that a failure to recognise this point substantially undermines Boghossian’s (2006, passim) treatment of 
the debate between Galileoas the proponent of a ‘new’ scientific worldviewand Cardinal Belarminewho 
represents the religious worldview. In short, he characterises Cardinal Belarmine’s refusal to look down 
Galileo’s telescope as both dogmatic, in that it reflects a fundamental disinterest in the truth, and also the 
product of some sort of epistemic principle that forms part of his epistemic framework. But what epistemic 
principle could it be that licenses dogmatism of this sort? It seems, ultimately, that what Boghossian has in mind 
is merely a religious principle rather than an epistemic-cum-religious principle. Actually, if one examines more 
closely the historical facts underlying this case, it is more plausible to suppose that Cardinal Belarmine is not 
being dogmatic at all. To make this point vivid, suppose that Cardinal Belarmine had looked down that 
telescopewhy should what he sees bring him to change his beliefs in a radical way? For one thing, he is 
unfamiliar with the technology, so it is hardly as if he can make an ‘observation’ here, in the usual sense of an 
‘observation’. Indeed, to the untutored eye, all that telescopes would offer the observer at this early stage in the 
development of this new technology is something akin to smudges, but what moral should one draw from the 
fact that a new technology provides you with smudges that purport to be of the heavens? I am grateful to Martin 
Kusch for discussion on this point.   
9  Note the parallels between how I have formulated P2 and the formulation of the (single-premise) ‘closure’ 
principle for knowledge offered by Williamson (2000, 117; cf. Hawthorne 2005). 
10  In particular, one might think that inferences of this general sort fall under a category of inferences where the 
epistemic support for the premises does not ‘transmit’ across the relevant competent deduction to be epistemic 
support for the conclusion. For a key recent discussion of this claim, see the exchange between Wright (2004) 
and Davies (2004). Since, as we will now see, the supposed dogmatic conclusion of this argument can be 
avoided even if one allows the inference from P1 to C1, I will let this point pass. 
11  Although I have not the space to explore this issue further here, I think that understanding why a dialectical 
epistemic relativism is such a benign epistemological thesis is key to recognising why the quite common 
reading of some of Wittgenstein’s remarks in his later writingsespecially those concerning “hinge” 
propositions in On Certainty (Wittgenstein 1969)as expressing a rather radical form of relativism are 
misguided. Most recently, this claim has been made by Boghossian (2006, passim). For a spirited defence of 
Wittgenstein in this regard, see Williams (2007). For more on Wittgenstein’s epistemology, see Pritchard 
(forthcoming).  
12  Thanks to Brit Brogaard, Adrian Haddock, Mark Eli Kalderon, Martin Kusch and Michael Williams. This 
paper was written, in part, while in receipt of an AHRC research leave award. It also forms part of the research 
output for the AHRC-funded project entitled ‘The Value of Knowledge’ which is based at the University of 
Stirling. 
